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Abstract
We investigate the relationship between the frequency spectrum of image data and the generaliza-
tion behavior of convolutional neural networks (CNN). We first notice CNN’s ability in capturing the
high-frequency components of images. These high-frequency components are almost imperceptible to
a human. Thus the observation can serve as one of the explanations of the existence of adversarial
examples, and can also help verify CNN’s trade-off between robustness and accuracy. Our observation
also immediately leads to methods that can improve the adversarial robustness of trained CNNs.
Finally, we also utilize this observation to design a (semi) black-box adversarial attack method.
1 Introduction
Deep learning has achieved many recent advances in predictive modeling in various tasks, while the
community has nonetheless become alarmed by the unintuitive generalization behaviors of neural networks,
such as the capacity in memorizing label shuffled data (Zhang et al., 2017) and the vulnerability towards
adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2015)
To explain the generalization behaviors of neural networks, many theoretical breakthroughs have been
made progressively, including studying the properties of stochastic gradient descent (Keskar et al., 2017),
different complexity measures (Neyshabur et al., 2017), generalization gaps (Schmidt et al., 2018), and
many more from different model or algorithm perspectives (Kawaguchi et al., 2017; Mahloujifar et al.,
2018; Bubeck et al., 2018; Shamir et al., 2019).
In this paper, inspired by previous understandings that convolutional neural networks (CNN) can learn
from confounding signals (Wang et al., 2017) and superficial signals (Jo and Bengio, 2017; Geirhos et al.,
2019; Wang et al., 2019), we investigate the generalization behaviors of CNN from a data perspective.
Concurrently with (Ilyas et al., 2019), we suggest that the unintuitive generalization behaviors of CNN as
a direct outcome of the perceptional disparity between human and models:
CNN can view the data at a much higher granularity than the human can.
However, different from (Ilyas et al., 2019), we provide an interpretation of this high granularity of
the model’s perception:
CNN can exploit the high-frequency image components that are not perceivable to human.
For example, Figure 1 shows the prediction results of three selected testing samples from the MNIST
data set and three testing samples from CIFAR10 data set, together with the prediction results of the
high and low-frequency component counterparts. For these examples, the prediction outcomes are almost
entirely determined by the high-frequency components of the image, which are barely perceivable to
human. On the other hand, the low-frequency components, which almost look identical to the original
image to human, are predicted to something distinctly different by the model.
Motivated by the the above empirical observations, in this paper we further investigate the general-
ization behaviors of CNN and attempt to explain such behaviors via differential responses to the image
frequency spectrum of the inputs (Remark 1). Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We reveal the existing trade-off between CNN’s accuracy and robustness by offering examples
of how CNN exploits the high-frequency components of images to trade robustness for accuracy
(Corollary 1).
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(a) A sample of digit 5 in MNIST (b) A sample of digit 0 in MNIST (c) A sample of digit 2 in MNIST
(d) A sample of cat in CIFAR10 (e) A sample of bird in CIFAR10 (f) A sample of frog in CIFAR10
Figure 1: Three testing samples selected from MNIST and three testing samples selected from CIFAR10
that help explain that CNN can capture the high-frequency image: the models correctly predict the
original image (1st column in each panel) and the high-frequency reconstructed image (3rd column in
each panel), but incorrectly predict the low-frequency reconstructed image (2nd column in each panel).
The prediction confidences are also shown. For these samples, the distributions of prediction confidences
of original images tend to behave similarly to the ones of high-frequency components. The frequency
components are split with r = 10 in MNIST and r = 12 in CIFAR10. Details of the experiment will be
introduced later.
• We propose defense methods that can help improve the adversarial robustness of CNN without
training or fine-tuning the model.
• We introduce a new black box attack method that simply perturbs the high-frequency components
of an image.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first introduce related discussions.
In Section 3, we will present our main contributions, including a formal discussion on that CNN can
exploit high-frequency components, which naturally leads to the trade-off between adversarial robustness
and accuracy, new defense and attack methods. These contributions are later verified by experiments in
Section 4. Then we will briefly discuss some related topics in Section 5 before we finally conclude the
paper in Section 6.
2 Related Work
Ever since Szegedy et al. (2013) demonstrated the phenomenon of adversarial examples (i.e., samples
with small perturbations that are imperceptible to human can deceive the model, altering predictions
dramatically), the study of this unintuitive generalization behavior of neural networks leads to various
results. For example, one branch of the study focuses on developing the methods, namely attack methods,
to generate adversarial examples. These attack methods mostly assume the full knowledge, e.g., parameters
and gradients, of the model (white-box methods), such as FGSM that moves a single step along the
direction of the gradient (Goodfellow et al., 2015), DeepFool that iteratively searches for a minimum norm
perturbation (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016), and C&W attack that seeks a perturbation with minimum
distance to the original image (Carlini and Wagner, 2017); some other attacks assume limited knowledge
of the model (black-box methods), such as SinglePixel attack or Salt&Pepper attack (Rauber et al., 2017)
that iteratively perturb the sample until the model misclassifies. Alongside innovations in methods for
attacking classifiers are myriad defensive measures, such as defensive distillation (Papernot et al., 2016),
Parseval networks (Cisse et al., 2017), and adversarial training (Madry et al., 2018b). These are but a few
highlights among a long history of proposed attack and defense methods. One can refer to comprehensive
reviews for detailed discussions (Akhtar and Mian, 2018; Chakraborty et al., 2018), yet shall be aware
that newer works are introduced proliferatively (e.g., Ilyas et al., 2018; Yan et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2018b;
Alaifari et al., 2019; Xiao et al., 2019; Song et al., 2019; Farnia et al., 2019; Wong et al., 2019).
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While resulting in torrent research, the arm-race between attack and defense methods also leads the
community to consider whether adversarial examples are inevitable. Shafahi et al. (2019) offered an
affirmative answer with a series of analytic studies and empirical results. With designed data distributions,
Tsipras et al. (2019) demonstrated the existence of a trade-off between a model’s robustness and accuracy.
Related theoretical discussions have also been offered (Zhang et al., 2019).
Key Differences: This paper studies the related topics from a data perspective, we extend previous
discussions by offering interpretable observations connected to the phenomenon of adversarial examples
and the trade-off between robustness and accuracy; then we continue to make methodological contributions
based on the observations. To the best of our knowledge, there are only concurrent studies focusing on
the data perspective (Ilyas et al., 2019), and our paper materializes the discussion of (Ilyas et al., 2019)
by offering explanations of the imperceptible features.
3 The Frequency Spectrum and CNN’s Generalization Behavior
We first set up the basic notations used in this paper: 〈x,y〉 denotes a data sample (the image and the
corresponding label). f(·; θ) denotes a convolutional neural network whose parameters are denoted as θ.
We use H to denote a human model, and as a result, f(·;H) denotes how human will classify the data
·. l(·, ·) denotes a generic loss function (e.g., cross entropy loss). α(·, ·) denotes a function evaluating
prediction accuracy (for every sample, this function yields 1.0 if the sample is correctly classified, 0.0
otherwise). d(·, ·) denotes a function evaluating the distance between two vectors. F(·) denotes the
Fourier transform; thus, F−1(·) denotes the inverse Fourier transform. We use z to denote the frequency
component of a sample. Therefore, we have z = F(x) and x = F−1(z).
3.1 CNN Exploit High-frequency Components
We decompose the raw data x = {xl,xh}, where xl and xh denote the low-frequency component and
high-frequency component of x. We have the following four equations:
z = F(x), zl, zh = t(z; r), xl = F−1(zl), xh = F−1(zh),
where t(·; r) denotes a thresholding function that separates the low and high frequency components from
z according to a hyperparameter, radius r.
To define t(·; r) formally, we first consider a grayscale (one channel) image of size n × n with N
possible pixel values (in other words, x ∈ Nn×n), then we have z ∈ Cn×n, where C denotes the complex
number. We use z(i, j) to index the value of z at position (i, j), and we use ci, cj to denote the centroid.
We have the equation zl, zh = t(z; r) formally defined as:
zl(i, j) =
{
z(i, j), if d((i, j), (ci, cj)) ≤ r
0, otherwise
, zh(i, j) =
{
0, if d((i, j), (ci, cj)) ≤ r
z(i, j), otherwise
We consider d(·, ·) in t(·; r) as the Euclidean distance in this paper. If x has more than one channel,
then t(·; r), F(·) and F−1(·) operate on every channel of pixels independently.
Remark 1. With an assumption (referred to as A1) that presumes “only xl is perceivable to human, but
both xl and xh are perceivable to a CNN,” we have:
y := f(x;H) = f(xl;H),
but when a CNN is trained with
argmin
θ
l(f(x; θ),y), which is equivalent to argmin
θ
l(f({xl,xh}; θ),y),
CNN may learn to exploit xh to minimize the loss. As a result, CNN’s generalization behavior appears
unintuitive to a human.
Notice that “CNN may learn to exploit xh” differs from “CNN overfit” because xh can contain more
information than sample-specific idiosyncrasy, and these more information can be generalizable across
training, validation, and testing sets, but are just imperceptible to a human.
As Assumption A1 has been demonstrated to hold in some cases (e.g., in Figure 1), we believe
Remark 1 can serve as one of the explanations to CNN’s generalization behavior. For example, the
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adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2015) can be generated by perturbing xh;
the capacity of CNN in reducing training error to zero over label shuffled data (Zhang et al., 2017) can be
seen as a result of exploiting xh and overfitting sample-specific idiosyncrasy; then, the observation that
CNN do not directly memorize the data when labels are not shuffled may be explained by the tendency
of CNN towards learning simple, low-frequent functions (Rahaman et al., 2018), although this tendency
is not within the scope of this paper.
3.2 Trade-off between Robustness and Accuracy
We continue with Remark 1 and discuss CNN’s trade-off between robustness and accuracy given θ from
the image frequency perspective. We first formally state the accuracy of θ as:
E(x,y)α(f(x; θ),y) (1)
and the robustness of θ as (following conventions e.g., Carlini et al., 2019):
E(x,y) min
x′:d(x′,x)≤
α(f(x′; θ),y) (2)
where  is the upper bound of the perturbation allowed.
With another assumption (referred to as A2): “for model θ, there exists a sample 〈x,y〉 such that:
f(x; θ) 6= f(xl; θ), ”
we can extend our main argument (Remark 1) to a formal statement:
Corollary 1. With assumptions A1 and A2, there exists a sample 〈x,y〉 that the model θ cannot predict
both accurately (evaluated to be 1.0 by Equation 1) and robustly (evaluated to be 1.0 by Equation 2) under
any distance metric d(·, ·) and bound  as long as  ≥ d(x,xl).
The proof is a direct outcome of the previous discussion and thus omitted. The Assumption A2 can
also be verified empirically (e.g., in Figure 1), therefore we can safely state that Corollary 1 can serve as
one of the explanations to the trade-off between CNN’s robustness and accuracy.
Corollary 1 does not necessarily share the same goal of other theoretical trade-off discussions along
with their directions focusing on the statistical properties of the model but intends to expand along a
new dimension concerning with the nature of the data, especially the frequency spectrum of the images.
One advantage of our direction is that we can conveniently offer real-world interpretable examples as
justifications of our discussion. Also, intuitive explanations can immediately inspire us to contribute to
the rich collection of adversarial attack/defense methods.
3.3 Improving the Adversarial Robustness by Focusing on Low-Frequency
Components
Within the scope of this paper, we are only interested in improving the adversarial robustness of clean-data
trained CNNs without extra learning or even fine-tuning procedure. We focus on trained CNNs because
of 1) the practical value of improving the adversarial robustness of deployed CNNs in industry and 2) the
research value of verifying our previous discussions by eliminating the influence from other factors during
further learning or fine-tuning.
Remark 1 straightforwardly leads to a solution to improve CNN’s robustness towards human level:
cleaning the high-frequency components of an input image. Thus, we have our first defense method:
D1: During testing, for any input image x, transform it into the corresponding xl with radius r.
However, processing every input image can be computationally expensive, so we propose another
method that only operates on the model space: instead of transforming x to xl, we transform θ to θl:
D2: For model θ, we use θ1 to denote the first convolutional layer. θ1(i) denotes the ith convolutional
kernel. For every i, we compute the low-frequency components of θ1(i) with:
φ1(i) = F(θ1(i)), φ1l (i), φ1h(i) = t(φ1(i), r), θ1l (i) = F−1(φ1l (i))
and get θ1l whose i
th convolutional kernel is θ1l (i). We replace θ
1 with θ1l and the remaining
parameters of θ stay unchanged. We use θl to denote the resulting model. Images are predicted via
θl.
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The rationale of D2 is shown with (the proof is in Appendix A):
Theorem 1. f(xl; θ) = f(x; θl) given a fixed radius r.
While Theorem 1 justifies D2, the method may be less than ideal in practice. One of the reasons is
when we apply F−1(·) on the perturbed frequency domain, the resulting θ1l usually has both real part
and imaginary part, but we can only replace θ1 with the real part of θ1l due to the structure of CNN. To
reduce this inconvenience, we also explore D2 extensions to perturb the weights of more layers.
3.4 High Frequency Attack
Finally, Remark 1 directly leads to an intuitive attack method, which we consider as an additional
contribution of this paper. We refer our attack method as High Frequency (HF) attack. HF does not
require the gradient information of the model but needs to query the model’s prediction to confirm the
success of the attack, similar to other (semi) black-box attacks.
The heuristic algorithm of HF is straightforward: given an image x ∈ Nn×m, HF starts with
r(0) =
√
n2 +m2/2 and gradually reduces the radius at Iteration i. For every radius r(i), HF maps
x to xl(i) and tests the model with xl(i). If f(xl(i); θ) 6= y, then HF terminates and returns xl(i) as
an adversarial example of x. If HF cannot find an adversarial example along the way, it also needs to
terminate before the radius gets too smaller and starts to discard the information that is meaningful to a
human. In practice, we set HF to terminate when r(i) = r(0)/10.
Due to the discrete nature of the image data, r(i) can be set in the following way to avoid unnecessary
computational load. With two pseudo-indices in and im, we use the tuple (in, im) to replace i, and
r(i) =
√
(n− in)2 + (m− im)2/2. Then i+ 1 is replaced by either (in + s, im) or (in, im + s) depending
on whether (n − in − s)2 + (m − im)2 or (n − in)2 + (m − im − s)2 is greater, where s (an integer at
least 1) is the step size. With this manner, we need mn/4s iterations. HF is guaranteed to test all the
possibilities if s = 1.
4 Experiments
We verify our discussions through experiments. We first test how defense methods help improve the
robustness of the original model against either generated adversarial examples or new attacks. Then, we
demonstrate the effectiveness of our High Frequency attack method.
Notice that we do not intend to claim that our defense/attack methods are superior to all existing ones,
and we believe our contributions are valid without such superiorities for following reasons: our methods,
as direct outcomes of Remark 1, can validate previous discussions, which, if validated, help explain CNN’s
unintuitive generalization behaviors; our defense methods improve the robustness of existing models
without any training or finetuning, thus are helpful for deployed models. D2 can even achieve this goal
without introducing extra input processing computations.
4.1 Experiment Setup
We experiment with four different data sets: MNIST (LeCun, 1998), FashionMNIST (Xiao et al., 2017),
CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky and Hinton, 2009), and ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009). We use a simple five-layer
CNN architecture for MNIST and FashioinMNIST data sets, and use the AlexNet architecture (Krizhevsky
et al., 2012) for CIFAR10 and ImageNet data sets. The prediction accuracy on clean testing images are
99.2% (MNIST), 92.9% (FashionMNIST), 83.1% (CIFAR10), and 53.4% (ImageNet). We consider three
attack methods: FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015), DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016), and C&W
(Carlini and Wagner, 2017). We use the default parameters in Foolbox (Rauber et al., 2017), and our
experiments suggest that these default parameters are effective enough in most cases. For the ImageNet
experiment, we use pretrained weights1 and only consider 100 classes (1st, 11th, ..., 991st class) from the
ImageNet validation set.
4.2 Improving Robustness Against Attacks
Against Attacks Towards Original Models: We first consider how D1 and D2 can help improve
the robustness of models against adversarial attacks towards the original models: we first attack the
1https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~guerzhoy/tf_alexnet/
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Figure 2: D1 helps improve the robustness of models against existing adversarial examples.
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Figure 3: D2 helps improve the robustness of models against existing adversarial examples.
trained models to generate adversarial examples, then improve the model with D1 or D2, and test the
performance of improved models over the generated adversarial examples.
The results of D1 and D2 are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively. These figures show the
curve of prediction accuracy of adversarial examples (Y-axis) over the maximum `∞ norm perturbation
allowed between adversarial examples and the original image (X-axis). For some data sets (FashionMNIST,
CIFAR10, and ImageNet), we divide the calculated distance by 255, so that the maximum `∞ norm
perturbation allowed for every adversarial sample is 1.0.
In Figure 2, we test D1 with three different radii, depending on the dimension of the testing images:
r = 5, 10, 15 for 28× 28 images (MNIST, FashionMNIST), r = 8, 12, 16 for 32× 32 images (CIFAR10),
and r = 60, 90, 120 for 227 × 227 images (ImageNet). We report these radius choices because images
processed with larger radii will behave almost identical to the original images, and images processed
with much smaller radii will be almost unrecognizable, and the prediction results become less interesting.
Except that in one case (FGSM attacking the FashionMNIST model), the default parameters of Foolbox
are effective enough to deceive the models. As we can see, the baseline curves drop dramatically as the
perturbation bound increases. However, models with D1 processing the images are almost uninfluenced
by the adversarial perturbations. For MNIST and FashionMNIST, D1 is particularly effective, as most
choices of the radius can raise the curve significantly. For CIFAR10 and ImageNet, the curve behaviors
are intuitively connected to the choice of radius: processing the images with a larger radius is not helpful
because the processing cannot necessarily erase the perturbations introduced through high-frequency
components; on the other hand, while processing with a smaller radius leads to a more robust model, the
prediction accuracy drops.
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Figure 4: Comparison of the three black box attack methods on the four data sets
In Figure 3, we report D2 with four different choices, depending on the CNN architecture. For the
simpler architecture for MNIST and FashionMNIST, we experiment with two radius choices (r = 2.0, 2.5)
with two strategies: only perturbing the first layer (n = 1) and perturbing the first two layers (n = 2).
For AlexNet, we also experiment with two radius choices (r = 5.0, 7.0) and with two different strategies:
only perturbing the first layer (n = 1) and also perturbing the second layer with radius 3.5 and the third
layer with radius 1.5 (denoted as n = 3). These parameter choices may look arbitrary, but we notice
that the performance of the method varies smoothly as a function of these parameters. Therefore, we
only report some representative choices to evaluate the method qualitatively, not quantitatively. In other
words, the exact choice of the parameter does not matter within this paper. As we can see, Figure 3 tells
the similar story as Figure 2. This similarity verifies Theorem 1: perturbing the weights is effectively the
same as perturbing the images.
Defense Against Attacks Towards Improved Models: We also experiment with the more
challenging case: we first apply D2 onto the CNN, then attack the improved models and evaluate the
robustness in comparison to the baseline. We do not consider D1 because D1 effectively masks the
gradient of the model, so attack methods such as FGSM, DeepFool, and C&W will be unlikely to succeed.
We test the same settings of D2 as the previous section. As this new case is more challenging than the
previous one, we only observe marginal improvements of our method.
We conjecture the marginal improvement is because these powerful attacks can still deceive the model
through perturbations on low-frequency signals after we block the high-frequency signals. To verify this
hypothesis, we plot some adversarial MNIST images generated by C&W to deceive the improved models.
In comparison, the adversarial images for the baseline look almost identical to the clean images to human,
but the adversarial images for the D2 improved models tend to have some clustered perturbations. These
perturbations, although still blurry, can at least offer the information to human which digit the model
will misclassify the image into. More discussions are in Appendix B.
In conclusion, the performances of these methods validate our main argument (Remark 1) of this
paper: CNN can exploit high-frequency components of images, which serve as one of the reasons of the
unintuitive generalization behaviors, and discarding the high-frequency components can help the CNN to
view the data as a human does, thus helps in improving robustness.
4.3 High Frequency Attack
Finally, we experiment with our High Frequency attack method. As the HF attack does not utilize
the gradients of the model, but only queries the model for whether an adversarial example has been
successfully generated, we compare it with attacks of similar mechanisms, such as SinglePixel attack and
Salt&Pepper attack (Rauber et al., 2017). Similarly, we use the default parameters in Foolbox.
We attack the baseline models with these methods and plot the accuracy-perturbation curve, as shown
in Figure 4. We can see that these attack methods are much less effective than the attack methods that
consider the gradient of the model. HF tends to be more effective than the competing methods as the
area under the accuracy-perturbation curve is clearly smaller. However, despite the clear advantage, we
do not intend to claim the HF is guaranteed to be superior to other competing attack methods. Instead,
these results suggest HF is reasonably effective, and thus validate Remark 1. which offers explanations to
the unintuitive generalization behaviors of CNN. Some adversarial examples are shown in Appendix C.
5 Discussion
Are high-frequency components just noises? As we have demonstrated that CNN can exploit the
high-frequency components of an image, a follow-up question is whether the signals we have noticed
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are indeed related to the frequency of an image, or just some “noises.” This question is important
because masking out the high-frequency components is one of the conventional methods for denoising
images (e.g., see Dabov et al., 2007). To answer this question, we experiment with another frequently
used image denoising method: truncated singular value decomposition (SVD) (e.g., see Lu, 1997). We
first decompose the image with SVD, then instead of separating the image into low-frequency and
high-frequency components, we separate the image into one reconstructed with dominant singular values
(the ones with bigger absolute values) and one reconstructed with trailing singular values (the ones with
smaller absolute values). For MNIST and FashionMNIST, with this set-up, and with up to 20 trailing
singular values (there are 28 in total), we do not find any images that align with the story in Figure 1
(i.e., samples are predicted correctly by noise components, but wrongly by clean components) for MNIST,
and we find much fewer images supporting this story for FashionMNIST. Our observations suggest the
signal CNN exploit is more than just random “noises”.
Does a more robust CNN also capture high-frequency signals? As we have only experimented
with CNNs optimized to minimize the empirical loss on clean training data, another follow-up question is
whether more robust CNNs will also exploit the high-frequency components. To answer this question,
we obtain adversarially trained models with PGD (Madry et al., 2018a) with the same architecture on
MNIST and FashionMNIST and repeat the experiments of Figure 1. We also test the models with HF
attack. For MNIST data set, we cannot find any samples that tell the story of Figure 1, and the HF
attack is less effective, although it can still deceive the model. This observation correlates well with the
understanding that more robust models tend to perceive the data more similarly to how a human does
(e.g., Kim et al., 2019). However, for FashionMNIST data set, we, unfortunately, notice more samples
that tell the story of Figure 1, and the HF attack is even more effective.
Other related CNN-analysis works adopting the Fourier transform technique: This work is
inspired by empirical observations showing that a CNN has a tendency in learning superficial statistics (Jo
and Bengio, 2017; Wang et al., 2019). Jo and Bengio (2017) showed that there is a large generalization gap
between images of different frequency-domain perturbations of the same model. Guo et al. (2018a) showed
that the adversarial attack is particular effective if the perturbations are constrained in low-frequent space,
which was further analyzed by Sharma et al. (2019), who also showed that the low-frequent perturbations
are perceivable to human. The major difference between our paper and (Guo et al., 2018a; Sharma et al.,
2019) is that we connect the model’s behavior on original images to that on high-frequency components
and explain model’s generalization behavior based on this connection. On the function space, Rahaman
et al. (2018) and Xu et al. (2019) showed that the networks tend to learn simple low-frequent functions
through Fourier transform analysis.
6 Conclusion
We started with an empirical observation suggesting that CNN can exploit high-frequency components
of an image, and led to Remark 1 stating that the unintuitive generalization behavior is partially due
to that CNN perceive the data at a much higher granularity than human. We consider Remark 1 as
the main contribution of this paper. Building around this main contribution, we discussed the trade-off
between robustness and accuracy and then proposed defense and attack methods. The experimental
results suggested that Remark 1, although initially based on observations from specific examples, is one
of the reasons accounting for CNN’s unintuitive generalization behaviors.
Finally, we need to clarify that our Remark 1 is probably only one of the explanations to the unintuitive
generalization behavior of CNN, and there may exist other features that are also captured by the CNN
and imperceptible to a human. However, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first work to go
beyond statistical arguments and offer some physical explanations to the generalization behavior of CNN.
Hopefully, this work has emphasized the importance of understanding the nature of data and can inspire
new branches of studies focusing on the data perspective.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Since the only differences between θ and θl are the convolutional kernels at the first layer, to show
f(xl; θ) = f(x; θl), we only need to show
xl ∗ θ1(i) = x ∗ θ1l (i), ∀i,
where ∗ denotes the convolution operation.
With Convolution Theorem (Bracewell, 1986), we have:
F(xl ∗ θ1(i)) = F(xl)F(θ1(i)) = zlφ1(i) and F(x ∗ θ1l (i)) = F(x)F(θ1l (i)) = zφ1l (i)
Recall the definition of t(·; r) and we know that with a fixed radius r, zl and φ1l (i) will have the same
sparsity pattern (i.e., values that are r away from the centroid will be masked as zeros). The result of the
dot product of the frequency domain will follow the same sparsity pattern, thus zlφ1(i) = zlφ1l (i) = zφ
1
l (i).
Therefore, we can have F(xl ∗ θ1(i)) = F(x ∗ θ1l (i)) and apply F−1(·) on both sides, we showed
xl ∗ θ1(i) = x ∗ θ1l (i) and thus proved the theorem.
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Figure 5: D2 helps improve the robustness of models against new adversarial examples (marginally).
B Defense Against Attacks Towards Improved Models
We now proceed to a more challenging case: we first apply D2 onto the CNN and then apply the attack
methods and evaluate how robustness of the improved model in comparison to the baseline method. We
do not consider D1 because D1 effectively masks the gradient of the model and attack methods such as
FGSM, DeepFool, and C&W will be unlikely to succeed. We test the same settings of D2 as the previous
section, and the results are shown in Figure 5.
As this new case is more challenging, we do not observe significant advantages of our method. However,
some interesting patterns are observed. For simpler data sets, we notice that our methods are superior to
baseline methods under DeepFool and C&W attacks, but are inferior or equivalent under FGSM attacks.
However, for more challenging data sets, we can only observe the advantages of our method on CIFAR10
data set under FGSM attacks. Our method behaves almost the same to baseline method in other settings.
Although the AUC does not seem to differentiate our improved models from the baseline model, a
more detailed investigation into the adversarial examples generated helps verify that our method works
as expected. In Figure 6, we showed five MNIST testing images, together with the adversarial examples
generated for the baseline model and our improved models. As we can see, the adversarial examples
generated for improved model tend to shift the “semantics” of the image. The most striking examples are
for Model (f) (D2(r = 1.0, n = 2)), where some images have to be perturbed dramatically to deceive
the model (3rd and 5th examples of the (f) column). However, D2(r = 1.0, n = 2) achieved this level of
robustness with a trade-off of the prediction accuracy, because D2(r = 1.0, n = 2) fails to classify the
some of the images, as marked by a square at the corner. For other models, we also observe patterns in
the perturbed images. For example, several images for improved models at the 4th row seem to turn a
digit 4 into digit 9. Similar patterns also exist that turn some images at the 3th row into digit 7, and
turn some images at the 5th row into digit 5. Therefore, although the numerical evaluation suggests
that our improved model barely improves upon the baseline model, these detailed inspection suggestions
that the adversarial examples generated as an attack to the improved models can be better perceived
by human. In contrast, as a result of perturbed high-frequent imperceptible components, adversarial
exampled generated as an attack to the original model (column (b)) do not show such patterns for a
human to understand which class these images have deceived the model to predict. As a result, we believe
our methods improved the model in a way that, when it is attacked, at least the differences induced by
adversarial examples can be perceived and understood by human. Also, it’s worth mentioning that we
achieved this level of perception without any training or finetuning, thus the method can be directly used
for deployed models.
13
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 6: Sample adversarial example C&W attack generate for different models. (a) original images, (b)
for baseline model (c) D2(r = 1.0, n = 1) (d) D2(r = 2.0, n = 1), (e) D2(r = 2.5, n = 1), (f) D2(r = 1.0,
n = 2), (g) D2(r = 2.0, n = 2), (h) D2(r = 2.5, n = 2). Images with a white square at the corner means
the original image was incorrectly classified by the model, so the attack was not performed. Adversarial
perturbations on improved models, although blurry, can be observed.
C HF Adversarial Examples
We show some successful adversarial examples that HF, SinglePixel, and Salt&Pepper can all successfully
attack the model, in Figure 7 for MNIST, Figure 8 for FashionMNIST, Figure 9 for CIFAR10, and
Figure 10 for ImageNet. Overall speaking, some of the adversarial images generated by HF are blurry.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 7: Examples of successful black box attacks for MNIST: first row: HF, second row: SinglePixel,
third row: Salt&Pepper
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 8: Examples of successful black box attacks for FashionMNIST: first row: HF, second row:
SinglePixel, third row: Salt&Pepper
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 9: Examples of successful black box attacks for CIFAR10: first row: HF, second row: SinglePixel,
third row: Salt&Pepper
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 10: Examples of successful black box attacks for ImageNet: first row: HF, second row: SinglePixel,
third row: Salt&Pepper
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